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1. Introduction
EU legal order recently endowed itself with two acts of fundamental rel-
evance for defining the powers of Nationals Authorities in the fields of 
consumers protection and antitrust.
On 17 January 2020, EU Regulation 2017/2394, on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protec-
tion laws1 (hereinafter “new CPC Regulation”), entered into force, repeal-
ing EC Regulation 2006/20042 (hereinafter “CPC Regulation”). This new 
Regulation lays down the conditions under which competent authorities 
of Member States (hereinafter “NCPAs”) are to cooperate and coordinate 
actions with each other and with the Commission to enforce compliance 
with the laws that protect consumers’ interests, ensure the smooth func-
tioning of the internal market, and enhance the protection of consumers’ 
economic interests. The Regulation applies to intra-Union infringements, 
widespread infringements and widespread infringements with a Union 
dimension (see paragraph 2.1.).
On 3 February 2019, EU Directive 2019/1, intended to empower Member 
States’ competition authorities to be more effective enforcers and to 
ensure the proper functioning of the internal market3 (so-called “ECN+ 
Directive”) entered into force and has to become law in the EU countries 
by 4 February 2021. This Directive guarantees EU countries’ national 
competition authorities (hereinafter “NCAs”) the necessary independ-
ence, resources and enforcement and fining powers necessary to tackle 
agreements and practices by companies that restrict competition within 
their jurisdiction and provides for mutual assistance between competition 
authorities (NCAs and Commission) to ensure that companies cannot 
escape from enforcement, in order for the EU’s Single Market to operate 
smoothly.
With these two acts, the powers of national authorities in the fields of 
consumer protection and antitrust field have grown, and this growth 
1 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer 
protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004, OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, 1-26.
2 Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 
2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer 
protection laws (Regulation on consumer protection cooperation), OJ L 364, 9.12.2004, 1-11.
3 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to 
empower Member States’ competition authorities to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the 
proper functioning of the internal market, OJ L 11, 14.1.2019, 3-33.
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has gone hand in hand with an increase in the forms of transnational 
cooperation. 
The present article will analyse the detailed discipline contained in the 
new CPC Regulation as regards the various NCPAs and their powers and 
the modernization of the means of cooperation available. Then, the article 
will focus on the ECN+ Directive, showing the new powers attributed to 
the NCAs and the tools of cooperation at their disposal. Thanks to this 
analysis, it will be shown that in both fields a satisfying level of approxima-
tion of the laws4 has been reached.
2. National Authorities’ powers in the consumer protection field
2.1. The new CPC Regulation
In the European Union, the NCPAs and the Commission are responsible for 
the enforcement of EU consumer protection laws, and they work together 
in what is called the “Consumer Protection Cooperation Network” (here-
inafter “CPC Network”). This Network was introduced by CPC Regulation 
2006/2004, which addressed the cooperation between national authorities 
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws5. However, 
this Regulation has been considered by the Commission insufficient to 
effectively address the enforcement challenges of the Single Market, includ-
ing the challenges of the Digital Single Market6. Indeed, the ineffective 
enforcement in cases of cross-border infringements, including infringe-
ments in the digital environment, has a double effect: on the one hand, it 
enables traders to evade enforcement by relocating within the Union; on 
the other hand, it gives rise to a distortion of competition for law-abiding 
traders operating either domestically or cross-border, online or offline, 
and thus directly harms consumers and undermines consumer confi-
dence in cross-border transactions and the internal market. Therefore, the 
Commission has considered that “An increased level of harmonisation that 
4 In the present article, the terms “approximation” and “harmonization” will be used with the 
same meaning. In this sense, see Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar of 16 July 2015, R. L. 
Trijber v. College van burgemeester en wethouders van Amsterdam and J. Harmsen v. Burgemeester 
van Amsterdam, C-340/14, EU:C:2015:505, paragraph 52.
5 Cf. Cristina Poncibò, “Networks to enforce European law: The case of the Consumer Protection 
Cooperation Network”, Springer Science (2011). 
6 In fact, Article 21a of Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 provided for a review of the effectiveness 
of that Regulation and its operational mechanisms. Following such review, the Commission 
concluded that Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 was not enough for the purpose.
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includes effective and efficient enforcement cooperation among competent 
public enforcement authorities is therefore necessary to detect, to inves-
tigate and to order the cessation or prohibition of the infringements”7. 
This is the reason why the new CPC Regulation 2017/2394 was adopted to 
replace CPC Regulation 2006/20048.
Briefly, while CPC Regulation 2006/2004 established the CPC Network, 
a network of competent public enforcers (NCPAs and the Commission) to 
tackle the infringements in a coordinated manner, the new CPC Regulation 
updates the cooperation framework to allow NCPAs from all countries 
in the European Economic Area to jointly address breaches of consumer 
rules when the trader and the consumer are established in different coun-
tries, and it also introduces some novelties. In fact, thanks to the update 
provided by the new CPC Regulation, NCPAs now have stronger pow-
ers to detect irregularities and take speedy action against rogue traders. 
Moreover, the cooperation has been made applicable to consumer rules 
belonging to 26 EU acts covering various areas, such as unfair commer-
cial practices, e-commerce, geo-blocking, package holidays, online selling, 
and passenger rights9.
Unlike the CPC Regulation 2006/2004, applicable only to “intra-Com-
munity infringements”10, the new CPC Regulation applies to three types 
of infringements: (i) “intra-EU infringements”, where consumers live in 
an EU country other than that in which the infringement took place or 
the trader responsible is based or where the relevant evidence or assets 
are to be found11; (ii) “widespread infringements”, which consist in (a) an 
act or an omission contrary to EU consumer protection law that harms or 
is likely to harm the collective interests of consumers in at least two EU 
countries other than the country in which it originated or took place, or in 
which the trader responsible for it is based, or where the evidence or assets 
7 Recital no. 3 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, supra.
8 Cf. Fabrizio Cafaggi, “Towards collaborative governance of European remedial and procedural 
law?”, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 19 (2018), 244-247.
9 The new CPC Regulation covers 26 EU laws that protect consumers’ interests listed in its annex 
(new ones may be added in the future to extend the scope of the Regulation to new legislative 
areas).
10 Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, supra.
11 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws, supra, Article 3(2).
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of the trader involved are to be found; (b) any acts or omissions contrary 
to EU consumer protection laws that harm or are likely to harm the collec-
tive interests of consumers and that have common features, including the 
same unlawful practice, the same interest being infringed, and that are 
occurring concurrently, committed by the same trader, in at least three EU 
countries12; (iii) “widespread infringements with an EU dimension” that 
occur when the consumers affected reside in at least two thirds of the EU 
countries, representing at least two thirds of the EU population13. Any of 
the aforementioned infringements can be an act or an omission and may 
have ceased before enforcement starts or is completed.
2.2. The actors of the CPC Network
As far as NCPAs are concerned, according to the new CPC Regulation, 
each Member State must choose three actors for the enforcement of con-
sumer protection laws. Firstly, each Member State must designate a “com-
petent authority”, that is, a public authority established either at national, 
regional or local level, responsible for enforcing the Union laws that pro-
tect consumers’ interests14. Secondly, they must establish the “single liai-
son office”, the public authority responsible for coordinating the applica-
tion of the new CPC Regulation within each Member State15. Thirdly, they 
have to identify a “designated body” having a legitimate interest in the 
cessation or prohibition of infringements of the Union laws that protect 
consumers’ interests. The “designated body” is instructed by a competent 
authority and acts on behalf of that competent authority for the purpose of 
gathering the necessary information and take the necessary enforcement 
measures available to that body under national law to bring about the ces-
sation or prohibition of the infringement16.
The various Member States opted for different solutions and sometimes 
made this attribution based on the different EU directives that have to 
be enforced. In Italy, for instance, the role of the Ministry of Economic 
Development is both the Italian single liaison office and the competent 
authority for several directives (i.e. Directive 85/577/EEC, Directive 
87/102/EEC, Directive 90/314/EEC, etc.), whereas the Italian Competition 
12 Ibid., Article 3(3).
13 Ibid., Article 3(4).
14 Ibid., Article 3(6).
15 Ibid., Article 3(7).
16 Ibid., Article 3(8).
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Authority (“AGCM”), the Authority for Communications Guarantees 
(“AGCOM”) and other independent authorities responsible for the enforce-
ment of other directives17. In France, though, the General Directorate for 
Competition Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (“DGCCRF”) of 
the Ministry of the Economy, Finances and Industry is the single liaison 
office and the competent authority for several directives, but some compe-
tences are delegated to other authorities or agencies18.
The new CPC Regulation provides that in cases like the ones just men-
tioned, where there is more than one competent authority, Member States 
shall ensure that “the respective duties of those competent authorities are 
clearly defined and that they collaborate closely in order to discharge those 
duties effectively”19.
2.3. The powers of the CPC Network actors
The new CPC Regulation confers NCPAs stronger powers to detect irreg-
ularities and take speedy action against rogue traders. In particular, it 
lists the  minimum investigative and enforcement powers  attributed to 
the NCPAs, which have to exercise those powers proportionally and in 
compliance with Union and national law, with applicable procedural safe-
guards, and with the principles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union20. However, it is important to stress that Member 
States are free to set out conditions and limits for the exercise of the powers 
in national law in accordance with Union law21, and they can also increase 
the rigour of the application of those powers.
17 See, for all the details, https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/national-consumer-bodies-italy_en, 
accessed May 9, 2020. Cf. Giacomo Pailli, Cristina Poncibò, “In search of an effective enforcement 
of consumer rights: The Italian case”, in Enforcement and Effectiveness of Consumer Law, ed. 
Hans-W. Micklitz, Geneviéve Saumiere (Switzerland: Springer, 2018), 350-352. For all the others 
Member States, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/consumers/consumer-protection/our-
partners-consumer-issues/national-consumer-bodies_en, accessed May 9, 2020.
18 See, for all the details, https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/organismes-nationaux-de-consommateurs-
france_en, accessed May 9, 2020.
19 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws, supra, Article 5(5).
20 Ibid., Article 10(2).
21 Where, for example, in accordance with national law, prior authorisation to enter the premises 
of natural persons and legal persons is required from the judicial authority of the Member State 
concerned, the power to enter such premises should be used only after such prior authorisation 
has been obtained. See Recital 19 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, supra.
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As far as the investigative powers are concerned, the new CPC Regulation 
provides for: (i) the power of access to any relevant documents, data or 
information related to an infringement22; (ii) the power to require any pub-
lic authority, body or agency within their Member State or any natural 
or legal person to provide any relevant information, data or documents 
for the purposes of establishing whether an infringement has occurred 
or is occurring and the details of such infringement (this power permits, 
for instance, to request information from domain registrars and banks 
to detect the identity of the responsible trader)23; (iii) the power to carry 
out necessary on-site inspections (including the power to enter any prem-
ises, land or means of transport that the trader concerned uses for pur-
poses related to his trade, business, craft or profession) or to request other 
public authorities to do so, in order to examine, take or obtain copies of 
information, data or documents, and the power to seize them for a neces-
sary period24; (iv) the power to request any representative or member of 
the staff of the trader concerned by the inspection to give explanations of 
facts, information, data or documents relating to the subject matter of the 
inspection and to record the answers25; (v) the power to purchase goods 
or services as test purchases, where necessary, under a cover identity (so-
called “mystery shopping”), in order to detect infringements and to obtain 
evidence (this power includes, for example, the possibility to carry out test 
purchases to check geographical discrimination or after-sales conditions 
such as withdrawal rights)26.
As for enforcement powers, according to the new CPC Regulation, 
NCPAs will be able: (i) to adopt interim measures to avoid the risk of seri-
ous harm to the collective interests of consumers27; (ii) to accept com-
mitments from the trader responsible for the infringement to cease that 
infringement28; (iii) to receive from the trader, on the trader’s initiative, 
additional remedial commitments for the benefit of consumers affected 
22 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws, supra, Article 9(3), letter a).
23 Ibid., Article 9(3), letter b).
24 Ibid., Article 9(3), letter c).
25 Ibid..
26 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws, supra, Article 9(3), letter d).
27 Ibid., Article 9(4), letter a).
28 Ibid., Article 9(4), letter b).
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by the alleged infringement29 (for example, reparation, replacement, price 
reductions, termination of contract or the reimbursement of the price paid 
for the goods or services); (iv) to inform consumers about how to seek 
compensation under national law30; (v) to order in writing the cessation of 
infringements by the trader31; (vi) to bring about the cessation or the pro-
hibition of infringements32; (vii) where no other effective means are avail-
able, competent authorities (or third parties or other public authorities 
upon request) have the power to remove content or to restrict access to an 
online interface and to order the explicit display of a warning to consum-
ers when they access an online interface, to order a hosting service pro-
vider to remove, disable or restrict access to an online interface, or to order 
domain registries or registrars to delete a fully qualified domain name and 
to allow the competent authority concerned to register it33; (viii) to impose 
penalties, such as fines or periodic penalty payments, for infringements 
and for the failure to comply with any decision, order, interim measure, 
trader’s commitment or other measure adopted pursuant to the new CPC 
Regulation34.
Moreover, the new CPC Regulation also provides that competent 
authorities shall have the power to start investigations or proceedings 
on their own initiative35, to publish any final decision, trader’s commit-
ments or orders adopted36, and to consult consumer organisations, trader 
associations, designated bodies or other persons concerned regarding the 
effectiveness of the proposed commitments in bringing the infringement 
to an end37.
Therefore, it is clear that, together with the more “classical” powers 
aimed at obtaining relevant information about the infringement, NCPAs 
now have powers that are more suitable within the framework of the 
Digital Single Market, such as the power to purchase goods or services 
as test purchases under a cover identity and the power to remove content 
from or restrict access to an online interface. 
29 Ibid., Article 9(4), letter c).
30 Ibid., Article 9(4), letter d).
31 Ibid., Article 9(4), letter e).
32 Ibid., Article 9(4), letter f).
33 Ibid., Article 9(4), letter g).
34 Ibid., Article 9(4), letter h).
35 Ibid., Article 9(6).
36 Ibid., Article 9(7).
37 Ibid., Article 9(8).
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The usefulness of these powers was not long in manifesting itself: just 
a few months after the entry into force of the new CPC Regulation, the 
Italian Competition Authority (“AGCM”) applied it by making use for the 
first time of the aforementioned power by ordering the shutdown of some 
websites that were advertising products with an allegedly preventive and 
therapeutic effectiveness against COVID-19 disease38.
In conclusion, it is possible to affirm that the list of powers contained 
in the new CPC Regulation is much more detailed and wider in compar-
ison with the provisions contained in the CPC Regulation 2006/200439. 
Therefore, it is evident that, in this field, the EU has brought about an 
intense approximation of the laws relying upon the legal basis of Article 
114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter 
“TFEU”). This means that with the new CPC Regulation the EU estab-
lished even more common rules and, as a consequence, deleted the differ-
ences between legal systems and overcame the high rate of non-compli-
ance with the Union’s acquis in the field of consumers’ protection. 
The fact that the list of powers contained in the new CPC Regulation is 
so detailed and wide is also relevant insofar as it helps to set with greater 
precision the boundaries of the power of the NCPAs and the Commission 
in the field of consumer protection. Moreover, the broad set of tools pro-
vided by the new CPC Regulation seem to be more suitable to make the 
detection and evidence of infringements more probable and to effectively 
38 See decisions of 27 March 2020 n. PS11733 and PS11735 of the ICA in which the Authority ordered 
the shutdown of the https://farmaciamaschile.it and http://farmacia-generica.it websites. Cf. Teresa 
Cimmino, “COVID-19 e pratiche commerciali sleali: la recente prassi della Commissione Europea 
e dell’Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato a tutela del consumatore”, Eurojus.it – 
Lémergenza sanitaria Covid-19 e il diritto dell’Uninone europa. La crisi, la cura, le prospettive, 
numero especiale (2020).
39 Article 4(6) letters form a) to g) of Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, supra, which 
stated that competent authorities shall have, at least, the right: “(a) to have access to any relevant 
document, in any form, related to the intra-Community infringement; (b) to require the supply by 
any person of relevant information related to the intra-Community infringement; (c) to carry out 
necessary on-site inspections; (d) to request in writing that the seller or supplier concerned cease 
the intra-Community infringement; (e) to obtain from the seller or supplier responsible for intra-
Community infringements an undertaking to cease the intra-Community infringement; and, 
where appropriate, to publish the resulting undertaking; (f) to require the cessation or prohibition 
of any intra-Community infringement and, where appropriate, to publish resulting decisions; 
(g) to require the losing defendant to make payments into the public purse or to any beneficiary 
designated in or under national legislation, in the event of failure to comply with the decision”.
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put an end to “modern” infringements such as the ones committed on the 
digital platforms.
2.4. The modernisation of the cooperation in the CPC Network
The possibility for the NCPAs to exercise the aforementioned powers 
is enriched by other significant novelties introduced by the new CPC 
Regulation which concern mutual assistance, coordinated investigation 
and enforcement mechanisms and rely on the EU law principle of sin-
cere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the European 
Union (hereinafter “TEU”). In fact, the new CPC Regulation aims to pro-
tect consumers against cross-border infringements to EU consumer law 
by modernising the cooperation of the relevant NCPAs in EU, European 
Economic Area (EEA) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
countries among themselves and with the Commission.
The new CPC Regulation provides some tools for mutual assistance 
regarding  intra-EU infringements by setting the procedure for requests 
for information and for enforcement measures from one EU country to 
another. The competent applicant authority shall send the request for 
mutual assistance – duly corroborated by the necessary information and 
evidences – to the single liaison office of the Member State of the requested 
authority, and the latter shall pass the request on to the appropriate compe-
tent authority40. The competent authority must then respond to the request 
within 30 days (unless otherwise agreed) and apply appropriate enforce-
ment measures, including penalties, without delay and normally within 6 
months. It may also seek to obtain commitments from the trader to offer 
adequate remedies to consumers affected by the infringement, and receive 
additional remedial commitments from the trader41.
It is worth noting that, if necessary, when responding to requests sub-
mitted through the mutual assistance mechanism, competent authori-
ties may also make use of other powers or measures granted to them at 
national level, including the power to initiate or refer matters for criminal 
prosecution42.
The new CPC Regulation also covers the conditions under which a 
request may be turned down. The requested authority may refuse to 
40 Ibid., Article 13(1) and (2).
41 Ibid., Article 12(1).
42 Ibid., Recital no. 21.
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comply with a request for information if it appears that the information is 
not needed to establish whether an intra-Union infringement has occurred 
or is occurring, or if criminal investigations or judicial proceedings have 
already been initiated against the same trader in respect of the same intra-
Union infringement before the judicial authorities in the Member State of 
the requested authority or of the applicant authority43, so that the principle 
of ne bis in idem is respected. The requested authority may therefore also 
refuse to comply with a request for enforcement measures44. Moreover, if 
the exercise of the necessary enforcement powers has already been ini-
tiated or an administrative decision has already been adopted in respect 
of the same intra-Union infringement and against the same trader in the 
Member State of the requested authority, the requested authority may 
refuse to adopt enforcement measures45. The same may happen if, follow-
ing an appropriate investigation, the requested authority concludes that 
no intra-Union infringement has occurred46, or if the requested author-
ity has accepted commitments proposed by the trader to cease the intra-
Union infringement within a set time limit and that time limit has not yet 
passed47.
Any refusal decision adopted by the requested authority must be moti-
vated and sent to the Commission48. Even in the event of a disagreement 
between the applicant authority and the requested authority, there may 
be an involvement of the Commission  – either upon request of the appli-
cant authority or the requested authority, or ex officio – which will issue 
its opinion49.
As far as widespread infringements and widespread infringements with 
a Union dimension are concerned, the new CPC Regulation provides 
for coordinated investigation and enforcement mechanisms, because in 
these contexts it is of the outmost importance to have a good level of rules 
harmonization. 
43 Ibid., Article 14(1).
44 Ibid., Article 14(2), letter a).
45 Ibid., Article 14(2), letter b).
46 Ibid., Article 14(2), letter c).
47 Ibid., Article 14(2), letter e). However, the requested authority shall comply with the request for 
enforcement measures under Article 12 if the trader fails to implement accepted commitments 
within the time limit referred to in point (e) of the first subparagraph.
48 Ibid., Article 14(3).
49 Ibid., Article 14(4).
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Before moving on to the analysis of the way coordinated actions work, 
it is worth explaining how to identify the NCPAs that must cooperate in 
order to face a specific widespread infringement or a specific widespread 
infringement with a Union dimension. In this regard, all relevant aspects 
of that infringement should be considered, particularly the place where the 
trader is established or resides, the location of the trader’s assets, the loca-
tion of the consumers harmed by the alleged infringement, and the place 
of the trader’s points of sale, namely shops and websites50.
With reference to the coordinated action, where there is a reasonable 
suspicion of a widespread infringement, competent authorities concerned 
must alert without delay the Commission, other competent authorities and 
liaison offices, and launch coordinated action where agreed, with a desig-
nated coordinator51.
If, instead, it is the Commission that becomes aware of a suspected wide-
scale EU-wide infringement, it must report it to the NCPAs. Thus, compe-
tent authorities must conduct appropriate investigations and start a coor-
dinated action if such investigations confirm that an infringement might 
be taking place. Coordinated actions to address widespread infringements 
with an EU dimension must always be coordinated by the Commission52.
EU countries may refuse to participate in a coordinated action for vari-
ous reasons. Refusal is admitted if there are already ongoing criminal 
investigations or judicial proceedings, a judgement has been given, or a 
court settlement has been reached concerning the same infringement, in 
order to respect the principle of ne bis in idem53. Moreover, the refusal may 
also come if an investigation has shown that the actual or potential effects 
of the alleged infringement are negligible in a country,54 or if the relevant 
infringement has not occurred in that competent authority’s Member State 
and, therefore, no enforcement measures need to be adopted55. Lastly, a 
competent authority may also refuse to participate in a coordinated action 
if it has already initiated the exercise of the necessary enforcement powers 
before the issuing of an alert by the Commission, if it has already adopted 
50 Ibid., Recital no. 28.
51 Ibid., Article 17(1).
52 Ibid., Article 17(3) and (4).
53 Ibid., Article 18(1), letter a).
54 Ibid., Article 18(1), letter c).
55 Ibid., Article 18(1), letter d).
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an administrative decision56, or if it has already accepted the commitments 
proposed by the trader57.
The designated coordinator has to communicate the common position 
adopted by the competent authorities involved to the trader,58 who may, 
on his own initiative, propose commitments to cease that infringement 
or offer remedial commitments to consumers affected by that infringe-
ment59. Then, where necessary, the competent authorities concerned shall 
take all necessary enforcement measures within their jurisdiction against 
the trader to bring about the cessation or prohibition of that infringement 
and, where appropriate, impose penalties, such as fines or periodic penalty 
payments60.
According to Article 22 of the new CPC Regulation, the coordinated 
action shall be closed if the competent authorities concerned conclude that 
the widespread infringement or widespread infringement with a Union 
dimension has ceased or been prohibited in all Member States concerned, 
or that no such infringement was committed.
Among the most recent coordinated actions, there is the one against 
rogue traders that advertise and sell products that allegedly prevent or 
cure the COVID-19 disease, such as protective masks, caps and hand 
sanitisers to consumers, that may be fake. The Commission has brought 
together national authorities working under the new CPC Regulation, 
which adopted the CPC Common Position COVID-1961 on how to deal 
with COVID-19 related scams.
Another example of coordinated action can be given by the Booking.com 
case, in which, following a dialogue with the CPC authorities, Booking.
com has committed to changes in the way it presents offers, discounts and 
prices to consumers62.
56 Ibid., Article 18(1), letter b).
57 Ibid., Article 18(1), letter e).
58 Ibid., Article 19(4).
59 Ibid., Article 20(1).
60 Ibid., Article 21(1) and (2).
61 Common Position Of Cpc Authorities, Stopping scams and tackling unfair business practices on 
online platforms in the context of the Coronavirus outbreak in the EU: https://ec.europa.eu/info/
sites/info/files/live_work_travel_in_the_eu/consumers/documents/cpc_common_position_
covid19.pdf.
62 The commitments proposed by Booking.com to change their websites in the EU, with the final 
deadline to implement all changes 16 June 2020 are: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/live_
work_travel_in_the_eu/consumers/documents/eu-wide_commitments_proposed_by_booking.
com_.pdf, accessed May 9, 2020.
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In the Airbnb case, instead, the CPC authorities, with the Norwegian 
Consumer Authority acting as a coordinator, adopted a common posi-
tion regarding the protection of consumers using the services of Airbnb63. 
Thanks to this coordinated action, Airbnb improved its presentation of 
prices in order to ensure that, whenever properties are offered, the con-
sumer is provided with the total price inclusive of all the applicable man-
datory charges and fees, to improve the fairness of its terms of services and 
to distinguish professional traders from private peer hosts.
Another relevant aspect of the modernization brought by the new CPC 
Regulation is that it also introduces new interesting cooperation tools for 
EU-wide activities such as alerts, exchange of information, sweeps and 
exchange of officials between competent authorities.
Among them, a new EU-wide market alert system has been provided 
for, so that emerging threats are detected more rapidly. This new alert 
system combines the system already existing under the CPC Regulation 
2006/2004 with a wider exchange of relevant and necessary information. 
A competent authority or the Commission shall notify other competent 
authorities and single liaison offices of any reasonable suspicion that an 
infringement that may affect consumers’ interests in other Member States 
is taking place in its territory64. When issuing an alert, the competent 
authority may ask competent authorities and the relevant single liaison 
offices in other Member States and the Commission to verify whether 
“similar suspected infringements are taking place in the territory of those 
63 Common position of national authorities within the CPC Network concerning the commercial 
practices and the terms of service of Airbnb Ireland:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/final_common_position_on_airbnb_ireland_4.6.2018_
en_002.pdf.
64 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws, supra, Article 26(1) and (2). Moreover, according to 
Article 26(3), when notifying, the competent authority or the Commission shall also provide: “(a) 
a description of the act or omission that constitutes the infringement; (b) details of the product or 
service concerned by the infringement; (c) the names of the Member States concerned or possibly 
concerned by the infringement; (d) the identity of the trader or traders responsible or suspected 
of being responsible for the infringement; (e) the legal basis for possible actions by reference to 
national law and the corresponding provisions of the Union legal acts listed in the Annex; (f) a 
description of any legal proceedings, enforcement measures or other measures taken concerning 
the infringement and their dates and duration, as well as the status thereof; (g) the identities of the 
competent authorities bringing the legal proceedings and taking other measures”.
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other Member States or whether any enforcement measures have already 
been taken against such infringements in those Member States”65. 
In addition, certain external bodies (such as consumer and trade associ-
ations, the European Consumer Centres and designated bodies given this 
power by the EU countries or by the Commission) will also be able to send 
alerts (so-called “external alerts”)66.
Finally, authorities may also decide to conduct sweeps, that is, coordi-
nated investigations of a consumer market to detect infringements, but 
these must normally be coordinated by the Commission67. For instance, 
in 2019, CPC authorities of 27 countries (25 EU countries, Norway and 
Iceland) screened 481 websites offering clothing and footwear, furniture 
and household items and electric appliances. The exercise revealed that 
67% of the screened online shops might be infringing basic EU consumer 
law68.
All in all, with the new CPC Regulation, the level of harmonisation of the 
cooperation tools has been deepened with respect to the CPC Regulation 
since national arrangements for the enforcement of EU consumer laws 
were not sufficient in a cross-border context. The importance of this har-
monisation is even more evident when considering that, in the absence of a 
EU framework for cooperation, the Member States would still have to rely 
either on a large number of bilateral agreements or on long and cumber-
some judicial or consular exchanges of evidence and documents. In addi-
tion, decisions against a trader located in another Member State would 
not always be enforceable, and this would render enforcement in cross-
border cases slow and often inefficient. Moreover, traders would relocate 
inside the Union to avoid compliance with enforcement decisions taken 
in one Member State, and this would in turn distort the level playing field 
and competition in the Single Market and reduce consumer trust in cross-
border transactions.
With the new CPC Regulation, not only has a modern, efficient and 
effective system that reduces the consumer detriment caused by cross-bor-
der and widespread infringements to EU consumer law been developed, 
65 Ibid., Article 26(4).
66 Ibid., Article 27.
67 Ibid., Article 29.
68 For further details, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_156, 
accessed May 9, 2020.
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but also a major possibility for NCPAs to reach similar outcomes regarding 
the same malpractices. 
3. National Authorities’ powers in the antitrust field 
As far as the antitrust field is concerned, in the EU, public antitrust enforce-
ment is competence of the Commission and the NCAs. Unlike what hap-
pens in the consumer protection field analysed above, in the antitrust 
enforcement field each Member State only has one NCA that enforces com-
petition law rules. For Instance, in Italy, the competition authority is the 
“Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato” (“AGCM”), whereas 
in France there is the “Autorité de la concurrence” and, in Germany, the 
“Bundeskartellamt” (“BKartA”).
The entry into force, on 1 May 2004, of Council Regulation 1/2003 on 
the implementation of the rules of competition laid down in Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU69 (former Articles 81 and 82 EC) developed NCAs’ enforce-
ment powers, allowing them to apply Article 101 TFEU to agreements or 
concerted practices that may affect trade between EU Member States, and 
Article 102 TFEU in applying national competition law to any abuse pro-
hibited by Article 102 TFEU. 
Regulation 1/2003 foresees mechanisms of close cooperation between 
all NCAs in the European Union. As a framework for these mechanisms, 
the “European Competition Network” (hereinafter “ECN Network”) has 
been established70. This Network was created in order to ensure that the 
same rules are applied consistently throughout the EU and that the work-
sharing is as efficient as possible. From the outset, it was made clear (as 
stated in the Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the 
Functioning of the NCAs71 that was adopted together with Regulation 
1/2003) that within the ECN Network all NCAs are independent from one 
another and that cooperation takes place on the basis of equality, respect 
and solidarity. Moreover, in this field, NCAs have parallel competences to 
those of the Commission. 
69 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003.
70 Fundamental rules of the ECN are set out in the Commission Notice on cooperation within the 
Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, paragraphs 43-53, to which all NCAs in 
the network have adhered by a special statement.
71 Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the NCAs: https://
ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/joint_statement_en.pdf.
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3.1. The ECN+ Directive
The enforcement powers set out in Regulation 1/2003 have been expanded 
by the ECN+ Directive 2019/172, adopted on 3 February 2019 by the 
European Parliament and the Council upon the double legal base of 
Articles 103 and 114 TFEU. This Directive empowers NCAs to be more 
effective enforcers and ensures the proper functioning of the internal 
market. In particular, it guarantees NCAs the necessary independence, 
resources and enforcement and fining powers necessary to tackle agree-
ments and practices that restrict competition within their jurisdiction and 
provides for mutual assistance between competition authorities to ensure 
that companies cannot escape from enforcement, in order for the EU’s 
Single Market to operate smoothly. 
The need to give NCAs more powers arose because, according to the 
Commission, over the past decade, NCAs have become the major enforc-
ers of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in the European Union73. Empirical data 
clearly shows that, from 2004 to 2017, over 85% of the enforcement deci-
sions taken pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are the result of the 
work of NCAs74 and that the number of decisions taken annually based on 
national antitrust rules has increased exponentially75.
However, major divergences exist in relation to NCAs’ enforcement 
powers, since they are defined by national procedural rules76. The ECN+ 
Directive thus aims at harmonising the institutional set-up, enforcement 
72 Directive (EU) 2019/1 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more 
effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, supra.
73 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Ten 
Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives, 
Brussels, 9.7.2014, COM/2014/0453 final, paragraph 8: “In the period covered from 1 May 2004 to 
December 2013, the application of the EU competition rules has grown at a remarkable rate, with 
approximately 780 cases being investigated by the Commission (122) and the NCAs (665)”.
74 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the 
proper functioning of the internal market, Brussels, 22.3.2017 COM(2017) 142 final, 2017/0063 
(COD), paragraph 1.
75 Federico Ghezzi, “L’efficacia dei poteri di enforcement delle autorità antitrust nazionali nella 
proposta di Direttiva europea e le possibili conseguenze sul sistema sanzionatorio italiano”, 
Rivista delle Società 62, no. 4 (2017): 803.
76 Ibid, 804; Maciej Bernatt, Marco Botta and Alexandr Svetlicinii, “The right of defense in the 
decentralized system of EU competition law enforcement. A call for harmonization from Central 
and Eastern Europe”, World Competition 41, no. 3 (2018): 309.
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powers, fines and leniency , and it introduces forms of cross-border coop-
eration among NCAs in EU competition rules enforcement77. 
3.2. The new powers of the NCAs
Chapters IV, V and VI of the ECN+ Directive provide NCAs powers which 
can be divided into three sections: enforcement powers, fining powers and 
the power to put in place leniency programmes.
As far as the first category is concerned, NCAs are, at a minimum, 
empowered to carry out unannounced company inspections, including 
the right to enter premises, examine records, seal buildings and question 
staff78. In doing so, they can obtain the necessary assistance of the police 
or of an equivalent enforcement authority to conduct the inspection79. 
Moreover, they can also search the homes of company directors, managers 
and employees if they suspect that they will find relevant books or other 
records there80, but this power can be put in place only if there is a prior 
authorisation of a national judicial authority. Furthermore, in order to col-
lect any information relevant for the application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, NCAs can directly request them to companies81 or they can com-
pulsorily summon a company representative to appear for an interview82.
Once NCAs find an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, they may 
order any illegal practices to stop and take appropriate action, including 
imposing structural or behavioural remedies83, order interim measures84 
77 For an analysis of the ECN+ draft Directive, see Marco Botta, “The Draft Directive on the Powers 
of National Competition Authorities: The glass half empty and half full”, European Competition 
Law Review 38, no. 10 (2017).
78 Directive (EU) 2019/1 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more 
effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, supra, Article 6(1), 
letters a) to e).
79 Ibid., Article 6(2). In Italy, for instance, it is up to the Guardia di Finanza to assist the “AGCM”, 
according to Article 10(8) of the Decree of the President of the Republic of 30 april 1998, no. 
217: “Regolamento in materia di procedure istruttorie di competenza dell’Autorità garante della 
concorrenza e del mercato”. On this point, cf. Alberto Franceschin, “Il ruolo della Guardia di 
finanza nell’esercizio dei poteri istruttori da parte dell’AGCM e della Commissione”, in Dizionario 
sistematico del Diritto della Concorrenza, ed. Lorenzo F. Pace (Italy: Jovene Editore, 2013), 218-228.
80 Directive (EU) 2019/1 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more 
effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, supra, Article 7.
81 Ibid., Article 8.
82 Ibid., Article 9.
83 Ibid., Article 10(1).
84 Ibid., Article 11(1).
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or make commitments offered by companies binding85 to achieve this. In 
case there have been material changes to any of the facts on which a com-
mitment decision is based, where undertakings or associations of under-
takings act contrary to their commitments, or where a decision was based 
on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the par-
ties, NCAs are able to reopen enforcement proceedings86. 
With regard to fining powers, NCAs can impose effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive fines in their own proceedings or seek to impose these in 
non-criminal judicial proceedings not only for infringements of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, but also when companies intentionally or negligently 
fail to cooperate with their investigative powers87. Moreover, they can 
impose effective proportionate and dissuasive periodic penalties in order to 
compel compliance with their investigative and decision-making powers88.
Finally, NCAs also have the power to put in place effective leniency pro-
grammes that encourage companies to report cartels throughout the EU89. 
However, a leniency programme can only be put in place under certain 
conditions, that is, that the applicant ended its involvement in the alleged 
secret cartel at the latest immediately following its leniency application, 
that it cooperates genuinely, fully, on a continuous basis and expedi-
tiously with the NCA from the time of its application until the authority 
has closed its enforcement proceedings against all parties under investiga-
tion by adopting a decision or has otherwise terminated its enforcement 
proceedings90. 
Since the ECN+ Directive has not yet been transposed by Member States, 
it is not yet possible to evaluate how much those States will empower their 
NCAs, whether they will just confer minimum powers as provided for in 
85 Ibid., Article 12(1).
86 Ibid., Article 12(3).
87 Ibid., Article 13(1) and (2).
88 Ibid., Article 16.
89 Ibid., Article 17 to 23.
90 Ibid., Article 19, letters a) and b). Such cooperation includes providing the NCA promptly with 
all relevant information and evidence relating to the alleged secret cartel, remaining at the NCA’s 
disposal to answer any request that may contribute to the establishment of facts, making directors, 
managers and other members of staff available for interviews with the NCA, not destroying, 
falsifying or concealing relevant information or evidence, and not disclosing the fact of its leniency 
application before the NCA has issued objections in the enforcement proceedings before it, unless 
otherwise agreed.
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the Directive or if they will increase them91. However, it is already evi-
dent that the expansion of the powers of NCAs provided for by the ECN+ 
Directive is considerable and that the system is modelled upon the inves-
tigative powers of the Commission. The advantage of the completion and 
consolidation of the investigative and repressive tools available to NCAs is 
that they can increase the effectiveness of the enforcement activities, facili-
tating the acquisition of the evidences of the infringement and easing the 
definition of the administrative procedure. Moreover, a certain degree of 
convergence between the minimum investigative powers is functional to 
ensure effective investigative cooperation within the ECN Network.
3.3. The cooperation tools in the ECN Network
When enforcing competition law, NCAs may face cross-border infringe-
ments that require a close cooperation between NCAs of different Member 
States. Therefore, MS must provide one other with mutual assistance so 
that, for example, companies with assets in other EU countries cannot 
escape fines. This is the reason why Chapter VII of the ECN+ Directive, on 
the application of the EU law principle of sincere cooperation enshrined by 
Article 4(3) TEU, is dedicated to mutual assistance between NCAs, in the 
belief that a closer cooperation between the nodes of the ECN Network is 
the condition for a more effective functioning of the public enforcement 
system. Articles 24 to 28 of the ECN+ Directive aim at counteracting some 
inefficiencies detected by the NCAs themselves.
The first cooperation tool is provided by Article 24 of the ECN+ Directive. 
According to this article, when a NCA carries out inspections or interviews 
on behalf of and for the account of other NCAs under Articles 6, 7 or 9 of 
the Directive (power to inspect business and other premises and to inter-
view), officials and other accompanying persons authorised or appointed 
by the applicant NCA shall be permitted to attend and to actively assist the 
requested NCA in the inspection or interview.
This provision is an important expression of the sincere cooperation prin-
ciple set out by Article 4(3) TEU: the explicit reference to the concrete and 
active exercise of powers will generate greater effectiveness in the investiga-
tion phase thanks to the sharing of the investigative activity and the powers 
91 For instance, as far as the Italian legal order is concerned, the main changes will surely concern 
the inspections and decision-making powers. On this point, cf. AGCM, Relazione annuale 
sull’attività svolta, 31 marzo 2019, available at: https://www.agcm.it/dotcmsdoc/relazioni-annuali/
relazioneannuale2018/Relazione_annuale_2019.pdf, accessed May 9, 2020.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   132 28/10/2020   23:06:53
133New CPC Regulation and ECN+ Directive | Claudia Massa
between the requesting NCA (interested in to the collection of information) 
and the requested one for reasons of territorial jurisdiction. For example, it 
will be much easier to carry out an interview in the presence of officials of 
both the requesting NCA, who know the information necessary to collect 
in order to evaluate the investigation elements, and the requested NCA, 
who may provide additional resources, knowledge and technical expertise.
Another cooperation tool is provided by Articles 25 and 26 of the ECN+ 
Directive, which aim at resolving the shortcomings of the ECN Network in 
terms of notification and enforcement of sanctions. In fact, both the notifi-
cation of objections and sanctions and the actual collection of the fines or 
penalty payments may encounter a clear obstacle in the incapacity of the 
proceeding NCA to reach the addressee if the latter resides in a Member 
State other than the one in which the NCA operates or, with reference to 
the enforcement of the sanctions, when the latter, while residing in the 
same State, does not have sufficient assets to comply.
Therefore, the ECN+ Directive envisages an intensification of the coop-
eration amongst NCAs, which not only provide their assistance in the pre-
paratory and information gathering phases, but also become the executive 
offshoots of the other authorities. These new possibilities ensure a territo-
rial proximity that will certainly have the effect not only of speeding up 
and facilitating the antitrust enforcement procedure, but also of improv-
ing its results. 
These acts are subject to the national laws of reference: the decisions sub-
ject to notification and enforcement must respect the law of the State in 
which the requesting NCA operates, while notifications and enforcement 
measures taken by the requested NCA must comply with the rules specific 
to that legal order. 
This aspect is reflected in the regime of the disputes on the legitimacy set 
out in the ECN+ Directive: Article 26 establishes that disputes concern-
ing the lawfulness of an act to be notified or the lawfulness of the uniform 
instrument permitting enforcement in the Member State of the requested 
authority shall fall within the competence of the competent bodies of the 
Member State of the applicant authority and shall be governed by the law 
of that Member State; on the other hand, disputes concerning enforcement 
measures taken in the Member State of the requested authority or concern-
ing the validity of a notification made by the requested authority shall fall 
within the competence of the competent bodies of the Member State of the 
requested authority and shall be governed by the law of that Member State.
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The advantage of this regime is that it creates a clear division of compe-
tences for the direct benefit of the subjects acting on the internal market 
who intend to challenge the aforementioned acts or measures; moreover, 
thanks to the application of the principle of territorial proximity, this 
regime also facilitates the work of courts, since they will have to decide 
on acts or measures adopted by the NCA of their own Member State, thus 
avoiding practical problems such as those of translation, increase of costs 
and lengthiness of procedures.
Cooperation amongst NCAs would be impossible without the provision 
of workable rules on limitation periods. In a system of parallel powers, 
national limitation periods for the imposition of fines or periodic penalty 
payments by the NCA “shall be suspended or interrupted for the dura-
tion of enforcement proceedings before national competition authori-
ties of other Member States or the Commission”92, and the suspension or 
interruption shall last “as long as the decision of that national competition 
authority is the subject of proceedings pending before a review court”93. 
However, “such suspension or interruption should not prevent Member 
States from maintaining or introducing absolute limitation periods, pro-
vided that the duration of such absolute limitation periods does not render 
the effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU practically impos-
sible or excessively difficult”94. 
The await of the decision of other NCAs or of the Commission related to 
an infringement concerning the same agreement, decision of an associa-
tion, concerted practice or other conduct prohibited by Articles 101 or 102 
TFEU is necessary in order to impose consistent, effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive fines and periodic penalty payments.
Overall, it is possible to affirm that the ECN+ Directive is based on the 
sincere cooperation principle because, in order to make the function-
ing of the public enforcement system more effective, there is not only the 
need for the NCAs to have greater powers, but it is fundamental that the 
latter mutually assist one other. This coordination is necessary from the 
moment the inspection begins until the phase of the enforcement of deci-
sions imposing fines or periodic penalty payments.
92 Directive (EU) 2019/1 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more 
effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, supra, Article 29(1).
93 Ibid., Article 29(2).
94 Ibid., Recital no. 70. 
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4. Conclusion
Among the most recent developments in EU consumer protection and 
antitrust law, there is the attribution of more powers to national authorities 
thanks to the entry into force of the new CPC Regulation and the adop-
tion of the ECN+ Directive. In parallel with the expansion of those pow-
ers, there has been an increase of cooperation tools at national authorities’ 
disposal, and this increase can be seen as the answer to the modernisation 
of the way economic operations are mostly carried out nowadays, that is, 
on digital platforms, in the Digital Single Market, and at European, not 
national level.
The new CPC Regulation, after having established that each Member 
State has to choose three actors for the enforcement of consumer protec-
tion laws (competent authorities, single liaison offices and designated bod-
ies), clearly sets the minimum investigation and enforcement powers of 
those subjects, yet giving Member States the freedom to set out conditions 
and limits for the exercise of the powers in national law, in accordance 
with Union law. Among the new powers provided by the aforementioned 
Regulation, in addition to those aimed at obtaining relevant informa-
tion about the infringements, there are two that are particularly efficient 
to face “modern” consumer protection law infringements carried out in 
the Digital Single Market: the power to purchase goods or services as 
test purchases under a cover identity, and the power to remove content 
or to restrict access to an online interface. As a matter of fact, as soon 
as the new CPC Regulation entered into force, they were immediately 
used, for instance, by the Italian Antitrust Authority, in the framework 
of the prompt response to the COVID-19 related crisis, in order to stop 
undertakings from advertising on their websites products with an alleg-
edly preventive and therapeutic effectiveness against the virus. Finally, the 
new CPC Regulation modernises the cooperation tools for exercising the 
enforcement powers, allowing a quicker and more efficient coordination 
and action of the Member States. This modernisation is extremely impor-
tant in a context in which economic operations are increasingly carried 
out in the digital environment and infringements of consumer protection 
laws are therefore most likely widespread in Europe.
The ECN+ Directive attributes NCAs wide enforcement and fining pow-
ers and the power to put in place leniency programmes, modelling them 
upon the powers of the Commission, and seeks to promote cooperation 
between public enforcers in the field of antitrust enforcement. Its Chapter 
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VII is devoted to the mutual assistance between authorities and contains 
four cooperation tools: the possibility for officials and other accompanying 
persons authorised by the applicant NCA to attend and to actively assist 
the requested NCA in the inspection or interview phases; the intensifica-
tion of the cooperation amongst the authorities in the phases of notifica-
tion and enforcement of sanctions; the provision of a coordinated regime 
for disputes on legitimacy; and the provision of rules on the suspension or 
interruption of limitation periods for the imposition of fines or periodic 
penalty payments by the NCAs.
The analysis of these two acts shows that in the fields of consumer pro-
tection and antitrust, a satisfying level of approximation of laws has been 
reached. Moreover, in both cases, the European Legislator has acted on a 
double level in order to respond to the same needs: on the one hand, since 
the decentralised enforcement of consumer protection and antitrust law 
has always been very efficient, there was a need for national authorities 
to have wider powers in order to improve their performances and to act 
even more efficiently; on the other hand, since the infringements of EU 
rules on consumer protection and antitrust easily have a European dimen-
sion today, there was a need for cooperation amongst national authorities 
and the Commission, which have to work together in the CPC and ECN 
Networks in order to preserve the internal market.
Even if the two EU acts at stake are two different types of acts (a regula-
tion and a directive), the similarities are manifold, both as regards their 
structure and their content. Not only do both acts provide a section related 
to the powers attributed to national authorities and a section dedicated to 
the means of transnational cooperation, but similarities can also be found 
with regard to single investigative or sanctioning powers that they provide 
for. For instance, both acts include the power to carry out necessary on-site 
inspections, the power of access to any relevant documents or informa-
tion related to an infringement, the power to accept commitments, and the 
power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments.
Precisely because they are similar, the two EU acts analysed in this arti-
cle may have similar effects. First of all, since they both contain a clear, 
detailed and wide set of powers and cooperation tools, they will both surely 
deter undertakings from putting in place practices that harm consumers 
or that restrict or distort competition within the internal market. Besides, 
they will both ease the detection and evidence of infringements because 
they provide authorities with new possibilities of action.
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As regards the new CPC Regulation, it will also help increase consum-
ers’ and businesses’ trust in e-commerce within the EU. Moreover, since 
it gives the possibility for certain external bodies (such as consumer and 
trade associations, the European Consumer Centres, and designated bod-
ies given this power by the EU countries or by the Commission) to send 
alerts (so-called “external alerts”), it will increase the role of stakeholders 
in the enforcement of consumer protection law.
As for the ECN+ Directive, it will remove the gaps and limitations of the 
tools and guarantees of NCAs which undermine the antitrust enforcement 
system and will ensure a level playing field for undertakings operating in 
the internal market.
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